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Abstract 
 
The paper considers the long-term trajectory of public health and whether a ‘Golden Era’ in 
Public Health might be coming to an end. While successful elements of the 20th century 
policy approach need still to be applied in the developing world, two significant flaws are 
now apparent within its core thinking.  It assumes that continuing economic growth will 
generate sufficient wealth to pay for the public health infrastructure and improvement 
needed in the 21st century when, in reality, externalised costs are spiralling. Secondly, there 
is growing mismatch between ecosystems and human progress. While 20th century 
development has undeniably improved public health, it has also undermined the capacity to 
maintain life on a sustainable basis and has generated other more negative health 
consequences.  For these and other reasons a rethink about the role, purpose and direction 
of public health is needed.   While health has to be at the heart of any viable notion of 
progress the dominant policy path offers new versions of the ‘health follows wealth’ 
position. The paper posits ecological public health as a radical project to reshape the 
conditions of existence. Both of these broad paths require different functions and purposes 
from their institutions, professions and politicians.  The paper suggests that eco-systems 
pressures, including climate change, are already adding to pressure for a change of course. 
(217 words) 
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The Path to the Golden Era 
 
Public health thinking and action incorporates a theory of progress, rarely discussed and not 
always evident in practice. At its core is JS Mill’s utilitarian notion that the purpose of public 
policy, and indeed of the state, is the advancement of the conditions of the many, including 
the most vulnerable.  Utilitarian ethics, it has been claimed, remains even today the 
lynchpin for good public health policies.1 Realistically, not all political systems or political 
elites have regarded progress in such terms, although the British model is presented as an 
ideal case of a society shifting inexorably from non-democracy to democracy. 2 As Friedrich 
Engels caustically observed in 1892, sanitary measures applied by British ruling élite may 
have indeed mitigated disease risks for the general populace,  they were certainly intended 
as a means protect their own social group and their families. 3 Similarly, while modern 
political scientists have acknowledged that such reform notions helped “coax the machinery 
of government to serve the public purpose”, such actions were politically palatable because 
economic growth made them affordable, without redistribution from the rich.4 Like many of 
the ideas proposed by Jeremy Bentham’s protégé, Edwin Chadwick, public health measures 
incorporated cost- benefit analysis;  not only were they intended to pay for themselves, but 
also to reduce financial burdens on the state.5   
 
Such assumptions, linking progress, economics and health, are now brought into question. 
Economic growth, upon which advances in public health have in a significant degree been 
predicated,  has been shown to be damaging the Earth’s climatic systems, planetary 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, while the more recently implanted, but now firmly 
embedded, neoliberal encouragement of the free market, is associated with growing 
economic inequality. 6, 7 Similarly cost-benefit analysis, which assumes the need to trade-off 
policy options – good or bad - to optimise social outcomes, is now faced by perplexing and 
possibly insurmountable questions over how Nature itself might be priced. What value, we 
ask here, is placed upon the damage due to urbanisation, overfishing or intensive farming? 
Is the demand for cheap energy, driven by mining innovations like hydraulic fracturing 
(‘fracking’), worth the risk of polluted water tables? These questions, and other 
consequences of growth forced upon health and the environment, form the central theme 
of this paper.   
 
It is a commonplace to observe that public health today operates in more complex times.  
From the perspective of the present the health threats of past must surely have focused 
minds; after all, there was far less scope for individual self protection; market failure was 
endemic; and it was self evident that the harms then encountered were only remediable 
through large scale public works.  In other words the Sanitary Movement, ‘Sanitarianism’, 
was blessed by a fair wind of public opinion and evidence. But was this true? This is a 
common perspective on Britain’s public health past. Indeed, it was a view enunciated by 
Tony Blair, during in his time as UK Prime Minister. By contrast, he said, health trends today 
operate in a different context, mostly set by freely-chosen behaviours and not 
environmentally-sourced harms; indeed, for Blair, matters like obesity or drug use were not 
public health issues at all, at least not in the classical sense. 8 Although Blair emphasised that 
something such be done, the underlying premise was that the determinants of health had 
shifted from the environmental and the collective to that of the level of the individual.  
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Blair’s understanding does seem to accord with the modern general society view. We live in 
a post-deference culture; people today, it said, now make their own decisions, free of the 
paternalism of the past. The new government-endorsed approach towards behaviour, 
instigated in the Blair period, and accorded the seal of approval of behavourial science, was 
that governments might ‘nudge’ behaviour, but not much more.9 10 This new account of 
human behaviour, based the modernising logic of individualism and market choice, 
accorded with the largest story of neoliberalism, in the terms critically described by the late 
French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu. 11 It was a definite project, he argued, having the explicit 
aim of replacing older statist, collective or institutionalised traditions of social management 
and coordination by market or quasi-market processes. Expressed in public health terms, 
and certainly in Mr Blair’s presentation, it represented shift of perspective away from 
population-based and collective influences, as in the thinking of the late epidemiologist 
Geoffrey Rose, 12 towards a more atomistic, equally market-framed view of human conduct.  
The unifying language, tying together both markets and human behaviour, became that of 
‘choice’.   
 
In some essential respects, neoliberalism represents a return to individualism of earlier 
times, then the contexting ideology confronting public health reform.  Given the parallel 
between market liberalism then and neoliberalism today, was it true public health 
movements encountered an easier process of reform? On the contrary, in political terms, 
opposition to Sanitarianism was of a similar ilk to opposition to public health today, such as 
criticism of 'nanny statism' or the appeal to voluntary self-reliance.  Change, when it did 
occur, was driven as much by drama – the lived experience of sanitary threat - as by either 
science or reasoned argument. In Westminster, London, in 1858, what became popularly 
known as the ‘Great Stink’ brought the monumental problems of failed sanitation literally to 
the door of policy makers, focusing their minds, eyes and nostrils, on the need for action. 13 
Then, little was understood about the microbial environment. The scientific backing for 
measures then, though thoroughly erroneous today (and in dispute then), was ‘just enough 
right’, as the public health theorist, C-E Winslow once observed. 14  Even with years of 
campaigning and public agitation the cause of clean water and elimination of filth required 
decades before the full benefits were felt.   
 
This is a more sober and realistic model of social change. It identifies the importance of 
unpredictability, messiness, power, and social-psychological factors having at least equal 
impact to science, evidence or ideological belief. Successful public health advocates have 
long understood this; it informed the bruising, decades-long campaigns against 'Big 
Tobacco', for example.  As with the Victorians modern public health advocates receive well-
practiced denunciations of their views (‘alarmist’), their intentions (‘nannyism’), or the 
impracticality of their measures (‘self-defeating’).  It is a constant refrain which unifies a 
portion of the media ranging from the celebrity-obsessed (eg the UK’s Daily Mail) to 
formerly Marxist (eg Spiked Online). It is a narrative which says that public health is illiberal, 
obsessive, moralistic and even dangerous.   
 
It is perhaps this noisy and contested background, as much as requirement to be seen as 
neutral and science-based, which explains the official change methodology of public health.  
The so-called evidence-based approach is gradualist, rationalist and linear: problems are 
identified, subject to scientific review, formulated into policy options, and finally, when 
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presented to policy makers, come under the banner of ideologically-free, value-neutral 
truths which ‘speak for themselves’.  The outcome is that minds, prejudices and outdated 
policies are set aside. This may indeed occur; as was the case of Norman Fowler, the British 
minister charged with addressing HIV/AIDS during the Thatcher era. Fowler made the 
transition from a Conservative politician to a public health advocate and HIV campaigner.15 
Even if the means of transmission of disease is clear cut, the means of resolution may not 
be. On many matters, the science is not at all clear, as ecological complexity increasingly 
substitutes for single cause theories of disease.16 Equally, those policies which have been 
evaluated, and are thus ‘evidence-based’, may not be of sufficient scale and scope and in 
any case the circumstance of their application may differ wildly.  The language of ‘delivery’, 
so often applied in public health, often assumes a decontextualised, decultured world , 
where a measure successful in one setting cab be applied to another.   
 
In fact, a great many public health measures have been disruptive, controversial, potentially 
ruinous (to political or scientific careers), or have continually uncertain consequences. 17 
Sanitary reform too had this potential and only with the hindsight of history do the multiple 
risks of conception and execution it faced disappear. And while modern public health 
activists may fondly recall the policy successes from Victorian era on - water, sewerage, local 
government, housing -  all of which were the infrastructural essentials through which the 
later Golden Era emerged, less attention has been given to fact that policy successes won 
through only by the narrowest of margins, that many measures fell flat, or that powerful 
economic élites, who felt challenged by their operation, successfully opposed them. 17 The 
1858 Big Stink changed London’s parliamentarians’ minds whereas the ‘Big Smoke’ of coal-
caused smog (smoke+fog) did not.  Health-damaging smog met a century of delay before 
clean air measures addressed it. 18  In sum, while society may indeed be far more complex 
today, and behavioural factors more prominent than in the past, advocacy for public health 
continues, almost uniformly (except for disrupted moments in time) as a contested and 
difficult terrain.  
 
To refer to the 20th century as being Golden Era, therefore, is to speak of a patchy process of 
improvement, accumulative in impact,  and shaped by changes in the standard of living, 
better food, better housing, technological changes which caused less physical stress to 
bodies, better education, protection from occupational risks, and a visibly cleaner living 
environment. This combination of economic and social advance allied with scientific 
knowledge enabled humanity to believe that the health of populations on a massive scale 
could be improved. For many it has, according to place, social class and social group. The 
Golden Era emerged gradually, often spasmodically, through a process of interlinked 
transitions we have described elsewhere. 19 It also occurred despite the parallel growth of 
serious issues that trouble thinkers about health, from Malthus to the present.20 These 
include large-scale global trends such as urbanisation,21, 22unsustainable resource use,23, 
24and economic inequalities.25-27 The full global health impact of climate change may still be 
a matter of speculation, but many points are clearer ‘knowns’. The rise of sea levels, by an 
estimated 1 metre by 2100, will result in the drowning of many coastal cities or island 
communities.28, 29  
 
A paradox has emerged in which the Golden Era has increased risks and benefits. For 
example as clean air legislation resolved the more visible features of pollution such as smog, 
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invisible particulate air pollution has risen as consequence of fuel-saving improvements in 
motor vehicle engine technology.30 We see not dissimilar paradoxes in many sectors such as 
food, farming, antibiotic use, persistent organic pollutants, waste, indeed almost the entire 
gamut of everyday products and practices of the consumer era upon which the ‘good life’ 
has been increasingly based.  
 
Recognising these contradictions and paradoxes does not mean the Golden Era should be 
dismissed as false or an epiphenomenon. Located at a point between the horrendous health 
impact of early industrialisation and urbanisation and a future of mounting uncertainty, the 
US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) rightly celebrated the 20thcentury for its (US) 
successes.31 Yet each of the CDC’s 20th century successes must now be tempered by more 
evidence and warnings (see Table 1). The debate today is whether, a decade into the 
21stcentury and despite real gains in capacity, the accomplishments of the Golden Era with 
its high points is now under threat.32-34 
 
Table 1. 20th century public health successes tempered by 21st century global problems 
and warnings 
 
 20th century US public health 
successes… 
…yet related 21st century global problems and 
warnings 
1.  Immunisation Inapplicability to NCD prevention; evidence of cultural or 
religious rejection 
2.  Motor-Vehicle Safety Rise in motor car use reducing physical activity 
3.  Workplace Safety Export of cheap, dangerous labour conditions to far-off 
countries via supply chain globalisation 
4.  Control of Infectious Diseases Rising antimicrobial resistance through over-use and 
inappropriate use 
5.  Declines in Deaths from Heart Disease 
and Stroke 
Rise in obesity and diet-related diseases in low and middle 
income developing countries 
6.  Safer and Healthier Foods Rapid global nutrition transition and over-consumption of 
meat and dairy alongside under-consumption of fruit and 
vegetables 
7.  Healthier Mothers and Babies Global health inequalities; continuing high child mortality 
8.  Family Planning Rapidly rising global population accompanied by ideological 
or religious attacks on contraception 
9.  Fluoridation of Drinking Water Rising soft drink consumption  
10.  Tobacco as a Health Hazard Spread of global tobacco brands to developing countries 
 
Source: CDC 199931 and authors 
 
Is the Golden Era of Public Health coming to end or just under strain? 
 
The WHO has identified the top ten current causes of death worldwide, with ischaemic 
heart disease at the top.35 The WHO, however, does not venture into futurology or identify 
long-term risks. Yet there is increasingly strong evidence of major threats ahead. Rockström 
and colleagues, for example, have presented a much cited overview from an eco-systems 
perspective,36 echoing the findings of the UN’s 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.37 
At the same time, social analysts of health point to wide inequalities.7, 38 Such lists betray 
one’s own disciplinary predilections, of course, but surely such summations are precisely 
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what the public health professions now need to compile to convey the ‘big picture’ it sees 
for the 21st century to policy-makers and the public alike.39 In line with our own ecological 
public health perspective,19 we here identify a list of contenders for high-level risks and 
threats to public health ahead; these are a mix of the biological, material, societal and 
cultural (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Some major 21st century risks and threats to public health 
 
 Risk and threat Comment 
1.  Eco-systems Stresses on biodiversity and land use have direct and indirect health impacts 
and undermine planetary and localised resilience.
37, 40
 
2.  Water stress Pressures on ‘blue’, ‘green’ and ‘grey’ water threaten potable water 
sustainability.
41
 
3.  Greenhouse Gas 
Effects 
Temperature change alters viability of current terrestrial and oceanic vitality, 
affecting humans.
42, 43
 Sea level rise threatens human habitation. 
29
 
4.  Infectious diseases Rising antimicrobial resistance threatens medical intervention
44
 ; increasing 
risk of zoonotic diseases spreading to humans.
45, 46
 
5.  Mental ill-health Societies may be richer but exhibit greater mental stresses. 
47, 48
 
6.  Urbanisation  The sheer number of people poses pressure on habitat, ecosystem services 
and resource-use.
22
 
7.  Healthcare costs These are immense (but variable) in rich economies and rising in lower 
income economies.
48, 49
 
8.  Economic 
inequalities 
Inequalities, over and above absolute low income, are drivers of health,
32
 and 
are wide within and between societies,
27, 50
 with impact on growth.
51
 
9.  Lifestyle Modern or westernising behaviour patterns expose populations to new 
combinations of dietary, physical activity, consumption and energy norms and 
habits.
52
 
10.  Food supply Shifting dietary patterns stretches world food supply, not least in relation to 
meat and dairy production’s resource use.
53, 54
 
11.  Religious 
intolerance 
The spread of evidence-based public health programmes and infrastructure is 
rejected by intolerant religious codes which see them as modes of control.
55
 
12.  Socio-political 
instability 
The global political order since the Soviet Union collapse is itself under strain; 
this is both weakening and exposing international health institutions.
56
 
57
 
 
Source: authors 
 
 
Arguably, one catalyst for a shift in public health thinking came with the 2007-08 financial 
crisis in which banks and the financial sector as a whole were exposed as a debt bubble on a 
massive scale.58 This upheaval highlighted the dominance of the growth economy as the 
under-writer for health improvement, highlighting the existence of a long-term unwritten 
‘compact’ or policy package that rising wealth could and would pay for rising healthcare 
expenditure. The key arguments were over how to pay for it (socialised or private 
arrangement) and the levels of supposedly affordable consumer debt. The tacit policy 
package was already shaky in the USA before the financial crisis; it was clear that private, 
but government supported, healthcare arrangements was a drag on the wider economy, 
accounting for $2.8 trillion in 2012, approaching a fifth of GDP, and spawning messy, 
partisan politics of healthcare reform from President Clinton to so-called Obamacare (but 
having origins much longer into the past 59).60 The costs of ill-health vary even within the 
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OECD, but when totals are computed for health and the environment, the full costs to 
society are immense.61 
 
Nor do environmental costs convert easily into monetary terms. The concept of positional 
goods is used to describe amenity losses due to urbanisation and construction, such as the 
loss of view of a park or a field, 62 but what value does society place on the elimination of an 
entire species? Our case here is that some costs are already so huge that they are ignored as 
generating implications almost too big to consider; hence they become immeasurable and 
are sidelined.  Let us now consider just two such bodies of costs, on environment and 
health.  Table 3 provides some current environmental costs and projections for 2050, drawn 
from The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) project of the UN.63 This suggests 
that, based on existing computations, total environmental costs look set to rise from an 
already significant $6,596bn in 2008, equivalent to 10.97% of global GDP that year, to 
$28,615 bn by 2050 (equivalent to 17.78% of global GDP in 2050.)  
 
 
Table 3. Annual environmental costs of the global economy in 2008 and projections for 
2050  
 
Environmental 
impact 
External costs in 
2008 (US$ bn) 
External cost 
relative to global 
GDP in 2008 
Projected external 
costs in 2050 (US 
$ bn) 
Projected external 
cost relative to 
global GDP in 
2050 
Greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions 
4,530 7.54% 20,809 12.93% 
Water abstraction 1,226 2.04% 4,702 2.92% 
Pollution (SOx, 
NOx, PM, VOCs, 
mercury) 
546 0.91% 1,926 1.20% 
General waste 197 0.33% 635 0.39% 
Natural resources 
Fish 
Timber 
 
54 
42 
 
0.09% 
0.07% 
 
287 
256 
 
0.18% 
0.16% 
Other ecosystem 
services, 
pollutants and 
waste 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
TOTAL 6,596 10.97% 28,615 17.78% 
 
Source: Trucost plc / UNEP & PRI 2010 
 
With regard to health, the figures are similarly huge.  One calculation is that in 2010-30, 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs) will cost a cumulative total of US $30 trillion, equivalent 
to 48% of global GDP in 2010.64 The same study estimated that mental health problems will 
add an additional loss of US$ 16.1 trillion in 2010-30. Within these costs, cardiovascular 
disease is set to rise by 22% to US$ 20,032 bn over the 20 year period. Diabetes is set to rise 
from $500 bn in 2010 to $745 bn by 2030. The greatest impact is expected to be in lower 
and middle income countries, such is the effect of the nutrition transition. Business 
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optimists see this as a growth opportunity for expensive medical technology even in poor 
societies,65 but can even affluent countries afford mounting healthcare costs, let alone low 
and middle income ones? In vastly expensive and wasteful private systems, such as the 
USA’s, costs unaffordable to employers are being increasingly transferred to the public 
purse.66 In the UK, sheltered from economic and social costs by the National Health Service, 
such is the recent acceptance of neoliberal orthodoxy applied to health that Alan Milburn, a 
former UK Labour health minister, could call for more “competition”, while attaching cost-
reducing faith to technologically speculative remedies like vaccines for “diabetes, obesity 
and cardiovascular disease”, as if chronic diseases were solely a matter of biological 
causation.67 Such costs are brakes on the improvement in living standards and public goods. 
Their scale perhaps explains why, in developed economies, many gains in the ‘social wage’ – 
pensions, healthcare, housing, infrastructure – are being renegotiated and are the subject to 
macro-economic debate, and are being privatised and reined back, presented as 
‘unaffordable’. 
 
According to Francis Fukuyama and Seth Colby, the former being one of the originators of 
the (US) neo-conservative (or neoliberal) outlook, the 1980s Reagan-Thatcher revolution 
legitimated a shift away from state-centric economic policies toward ones favourable to free 
markets. Over the period labour markets were liberalised as trade unions progressively lost 
their power to set wages; global trade increased; the rights of property owners were 
strengthened and taxes lowered; state-owned industries were privatised; and levels of 
regulation, particularly over the financial system, were diminished.  Together with a broader 
shift towards a more integrated global economy these changes stimulated a thirty-year 
period of growth.68 The 2007-08 commodity / banking crisis which generated a new Great 
Recession with its abrupt slowdown of production – at least in the West - ought to have 
been a signal to debate what sort of growth the world wants, and where public health sits in 
conceptions of progress. Across the world, food prices jumped, and in over 60 countries 
rapid controls and responses put in place to cushion populations added to the sense of 
uncertainty. The Arab Spring, a sequence of governmental ruptures, is also traced to the 
financial crisis, which exposed, beneath the surface, a combination of environmental, 
energy and economic crises.69 
 
Instead, the dominant governmental, business and economist response was to work all-out 
to return to ‘business-as-usual’. The public health community, like other welfare interest 
groups mostly based in, or reliant upon, the public sector, was largely side-lined, 
emphasising its status as recipient of the largesse of the wider economy. Some voices raised 
important questions,70-72 but the general conclusion that there has to be a wider 
reconfiguration of the political economy, with health at its core, barely featured. Indeed the 
consultation set up by the WHO in the aftermath of the financial crisis was designed to see 
how the “economic downturn may affect health spending, health services, health-seeking 
behaviour and health outcomes” and “to make the case for sustaining investments in 
health” rather than to reconfigure the economy around ill-health prevention.19, 73 The 
dominant response was to accept the need to rescue them and then shore up the debt-
fuelled finance markets,33 leading to on-going public sector ‘reform’, the reassertion of the 
case for de-regulation, privatisation, and wage restraint or cuts in service or provision or 
funding. 
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The role of public health in the pursuit of progress became confused in the late 20th century 
with economic prosperity and its consumption indicators, especially in terms of energy use 
and commercially-nudged products and lifestyles. This approach is almost certainly 
unsustainable.74  Whether one looks at climate change, eco-systems, food systems, social 
inequalities, or health itself, the dominant model of consumerist economics contains 
inherent risks. It also departs from public health’s early progress theory, which in JS Mill’s 
utilitarian formulation entailed not only moral and aesthetic development, achieved 
through education, but also what Mill referred to as a ‘steady-state’ economy where harm 
to Nature was presented as ‘off-limits’ to economic activity.75-77 What we describe as 
Ecological Public Health contains these philosophical and economic progress dimensions, 
among others. Why is this older and more radical tradition not now in the ascendancy? 
 
In fact, while the neoliberal growth model remains dominant, interesting divergences in 
what that means have emerged even in the developed world. In the case of energy use, 
Germany, through its recent energy policy (the Energiewende, or energy transition) has 
made a long-term commitment to renewables and the withdrawal from nuclear power, 
while the UK and USA, while mildly increasing their commitments to renewables, have 
encouraged investment in pollutant hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’).78,79, 80 These are 
different models of how to build economic growth and thus to fund public health, one 
restraining from and the other intent on pumping fossil fuel-derived carbon into the 
atmosphere.43, 81 Such concerns may seem recent, and to some sceptics or objectors, 
overblown, but the first warnings on the impact of the burning of fossil fuels on the Earth’s 
carbon cycle were made as early as 1924, by the public health statistician and biophysicist, 
Alfred Lotka.82 As with tobacco, challenges to the science of human and environment risk 
come from many sources, some self-interested (the fossil fuel industries in the case of fossil 
energy-related risk), others which represent an ideological aversion to limitations on free 
markets.83 It is appropriate that, after a period of research gestation, public health actors 
are now formulating analysis and policy measures to define the new direction for a new 
energy transition.84 
 
The food system is another example of a fundamental economy-health mismatch. That said, 
the 20th century was in some respects a period of remarkable food progress. Unprecedented 
quantity was produced, harnessing revolutionary techniques in production, distribution and 
processing.85 A production-focussed policy approach was put in place from the 1940s, 
focussed on raising output to make more food available, lower prices and enable improved 
access. This approach facilitated late 20th century consumer sovereignty and expanded food 
choice, with ordinary consumers offered unprecedented variety and ranges of foods at low 
costs.85, 86 The supermarket mode of retailing of 30,000 items in one store has been 
normalised and spread into the developing world.87 Agriculture accounts for c16% of 
greenhouse gas emissions. An outpouring of food products – many ‘ultra-processed’ to use 
Monteiro and colleagues’ classification88 – has contributed to a nutrition transition from 
simple foods to high-calorie foods, with resulting epidemic shifts,86 as well as environmental 
damage.36 Intensification of farming has caused eco-systems destruction, pollution and 
unsustainable water and energy use.89 And an over-production of food has enabled 
processors, retailers and caterers to become sometimes unwitting vectors of bad diet and 
ill-health. While Europeans consume as though there are 2 planets, the USA does so as 
though there are 3-4.90  
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The consumption patterns of the West are admired, emulated, hard-wired into culture, 
driven by retail chains and product marketing. Personal success imagery is linked to branded 
consumption behaviour thereby destabilising the positive element of traditional diets: 
simplicity, seasonality, eating according to need, sharing. Such is the impact of the nutrition 
transition that there are now 1.5 bn people obese or overweight and just 0.9 bn hungry,91 
and 65% of the world's population live in countries where overweight and obesity kills more 
people than underweight.92 For a decade, the UK has been collecting data on obesity as a 
prime cause of hospital admissions.  Old certainties about ever-reducing food prices have 
been replaced by the recognition of new uncertainties about food prices and import 
dependency. The new market normality is no longer the steady rise in production but 
volatility of supply,93 and long supply chains controlled by logistics technology.94  
 
Analyses such as these can generate evidence-based but gloomy prognoses. The UK 
Astronomer Royal, for example, a past President of the Royal Society, one of the world’s 
oldest scientific bodies, has stated that the 21stcentury has a 50:50 chance of humanity 
exterminating itself.95 The counter-narrative to the Golden Era can easily almost ‘out-
Malthus’ Malthus, and suggests a winding road to collapse.   Between these two polar 
opposites – Golden Era and Collapse – the latter the title of a popular book 96 - the public 
health world and practitioners exist and must chart an optimistic reconfiguration of political 
economy. Without necessarily subscribing to collapse thinking, there are good grounds for 
reviewing the now dominant neoliberal growth model, the context in which much recent 
public health and healthcare practice has been based. Happily, many economists, too, share 
these doubts. 97-101 If the formula defined by one perceptive critic in the 1970s as ‘health = 
medicine’ needs extensive reworking, 102 so too does the belief that economic growth or 
simply ‘wealth’ is the necessary precondition for health progress.103 
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The crisis of public health thinking: where are the certainties? 
 
All of the above points to the need for a fundamental rethink in public health. It is often 
taken for granted that the bio-medical model of public health has primacy but in recent 
decades it has become a truism that an increasing proportion of health problems are found 
in behavioural patterns with causation linked to culture and about which bio-medicine has 
little to say; parallel to this is the shocking impact of persistent religious intolerance along 
with geo-political instabilities, both sober reminders that public health is also, and must be, 
a moral movement. Alongside such cultural positioning is the hard evidence of pressure on 
eco-systems, and looming threats such as climate change and biodiversity loss.  For these 
reasons – cultural, economic, moral and environmental - we support the argument that the 
public health movement and its analysts should re-engage openly with the larger picture.  
We see five models, or traditions, of what is meant by public health on offer: the sanitary-
environmental, the biomedical, the social-behavioural, the techno-economic, and ecological 
public health itself (see Editorial).104 These are useful touchstones for any big scale thinking, 
structures through which the public health movement has engaged with change and argued 
its case. 
 
The sanitary-environmental model has perhaps been one of the greatest achievements of 
the developing world since the late 19th century. Major investment in health infrastructure – 
drains, water, houses, etc. - helped civilise and make safe rapidly urbanising societies in the 
West. Today, that kind of big change is urgently needed in the burgeoning megacities of the 
poor world, too often devoid of planning or drains. Here the key, unsung profession for 
public health has been the planners.105, 106  Another vital group are the engineers. More such 
investment is certainly needed and the cost is repaid many times in illness prevented.107 The 
cost-benefit of these utilitarian measures remains unimpeachable. 
 
Although the sanitary-environmental model was arguably the first representative form of 
public health in the modern period it was the bio-medical model which first legitimated the 
importance of the medical professions and has to a large extent been the health world’s 
public image.  While the technical advances in medical practice have been remarkable, the 
limits to what medical intervention can effect are also all too evident.  As noted above 
medical actions, particularly expressed in terms of personalised care, can be a major 
economic burden on families, employers and the state. But many genuine advances can be 
cost-reducing, such as effectively-used antibiotics or immunisation or more rapid forms of 
personal treatment. It is thus not necessarily the case that the more advanced the medicine, 
the higher the costs; in fact it should be the reverse. What medicine cannot do, however, is 
address the enormous distortions caused by social inequalities within and between 
societies. These tend to be matters resolvable only through political action. Nor can it 
address the wider ecological constraints on modern versions of progress: the need to invest 
in water conservation and safety, public education, the case for ‘low impact’ housing or 
adequate food supplies, and so on. As fast as medicine creates miracle cures – such as 
antibiotics –some are rendered less effective.108 Medicine may be able to invent bariatric 
‘cures’ for obesity but still not address the minds which want to over-eat or rein in the 
cultural influences which set and spread habits and aspirations to do so.109 The medical 
professions now recognise that resolution of this type of health problem lies outside 
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medicine.110 That said, modern medicine is enormously beneficial, with the proviso that it is 
used cautiously not carelessly.   
 
The role of bio-medicine in combating rising NCDs is limited, as noted. Hence the increasing 
policy focus on the social-behavioural model which, in overtaking the old health education 
approach, enlists the modern images and practices of marketing to urge or cajole or subvert 
consumers to change behaviour.9, 111 But what social marketing campaign to address ill-
health can possibly counteract the vast spending power of the food industry or the motor 
vehicle industry or the screen-based culture industry?112 The first warps consumption, the 
second constrains physical activity, and the third distorts minds and expectations.  
 
The final conventional approach to public health, the techno-economic model, admittedly a 
blurred concept for many working in the public health field, has triumphed in recent years, 
almost in spite of many public health criticisms of its ambitious claims. This is the model 
already considered earlier which proposes that health improves by getting wealthier and 
through technology, or in more subtle versions, technology allied to useful knowledge,113 
which is then applied to the determinants of health which can only be afforded by economic 
growth. In effect the policy formula is: economic growth + technology = improved human 
physiological development and capacity.114  
 
While these conventional models of public health intervention have each offered and still 
offer much, they miss the fundamental misalignment of bodies, environments and health. 
This is what the ecological public health model seeks to do, drawing in the strengths of the 
other models perhaps, but also through rethinking the conventions of public health inquiry 
and action.100, 108 It has emerged most forcefully on the issues of NCDs and obesity, where 
intractable multi-level problems require system change.109, 115 Ecological public health 
questions whether the 20th century global economy can be modified easily, and instead it 
strives to re-emphasise the mismatch between business-as-usual economic growth and 
healthy populations in healthy environments. Problems cannot be externalised because 
they ‘bite back’; human existence cannot be cut loose from planetary or biological 
dynamics. Ecological relationships need to be assumed, not just causal ones.  In recent 
public health reports on obesity and other pandemics and on the state of public health 
institutions, there are signs that something akin to ecological public health thinking is being 
proposed as necessary both to drive practice and resolve problems.112, 116, 110, 117, 118    
The crisis of institutions and powers: what drives change? 
 
Although achieving social progress requires some model of social change, it has been the 
simple practicality of public health measures in the past, rather than quality of their 
theorisation, which in large part explains their success.  On the other hand public health 
proponents are also Enlightenment dreamers, seeking a more rational, more just and more 
responsible world, one achieved through better information and evidence, scientific 
rationality,  public involvement and open debate and the advancement and advocacy of 
social reform. While the practical and more pragmatic approach is rooted in utilitarianism, 
broader progress thinking has many roots. One can detect the legacy of Georg Hegel (on a 
rational State), Immanuel Kant (on individual duty and education), Edwin Chadwick (on 
administration and functionality), Annie Besant (on sexual health rights and women’s 
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labour),Elizabeth Blackwell and Elizabeth Garrett Anderson (on medical education for 
women), John Stuart Mill (on economic and social progress) or John Dewey (on substantive 
democracy), Florence Nightingale and Mary Seacole (on hospital care), Hermann Biggs (on 
public health laboratories), Eleanor Rathbone (on household incomes) and John Snow (for a 
combination of imagination and data), to name just some. Over the years such lists of 
‘pioneers’ have been compiled. 119Among these European and US figures – and countless 
others from the worldwide public health movement – it is perhaps John Snow who carries a 
particular affection in conventional public health iconography, epitomising public health 
intervention as almost superman, a tough and resilient seeker of epidemiological truth.120 
 
Today, are such health heroes and heroines possible or even desirable?  Perhaps Microsoft 
billionaires Bill and Melinda Gates are equivalent figures. Certainly, their vastly wealthy 
Foundation, free of state trappings, acts as a honeypot for a dominant version of modern 
activism, attacking malaria, poverty, vaccination, genetic engineering, and more, with equal 
gusto and strategic clarity.121 These are mainly technological pursuits for immediate results, 
however. Their critics have argued that technical solutions might fix symptoms but do not 
necessarily resolve causes. Such partnerships are in danger of repeating oil-giant Rockefeller 
in the era of the League of Nations in the 1930s, another time of weak States.122  Do we 
really want another Big Corporate period to coincide with a continuing and deliberate 
weakening of the state, the process political scientists memorably call the ‘hollowing out’ of 
the state?123, 124 
 
While politicians might prefer, and certainly lionise the Gates approach, most public health 
personnel might be more comfortable with another, lower profile approach: slow evidence 
building, collective action, some opportunism, focussed attack, and capacity building.  
Perhaps the best illustration of this route to success is the spate of national tobacco bans at 
the end of the 20th century, culminating in the global Framework Convention; these stem 
from a combination of hard interventions, facts, tight arguments and well organised pro-
health alliances.125 These represent half a century of collective effort, often against huge 
odds and with little profile accorded, much opprobrium and accusation of unwarranted 
intrusiveness.126 
 
If there is no super-rich funder or well established campaign to champion ecological public 
health, this is partly due to the ubiquity of another approach subscribed to by governments 
and analysts: Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).These are frequently proposed as the 
answer to modern problems. They offer multi-actor, multi-level stakeholder-influenced 
effort. More importantly, they are favoured by ‘hollowed out’ states with tight public health 
budgets.127 PPPs seem to answer the difficulty: optimise leverage by inviting opponents to 
‘partner’; together ‘we will be more effective’. This approach, however, assumes that 
interests are aligned and that the capacities, supply chains and marketing systems of private 
business and finance are essential to achieve requisite leverage over all health. But is this 
true? And where does this power and analysis come from? Partly it stems from the 
argument from within public health itself that modern diseases are so complex in their 
aetiology that there are no simple measures for tackling them. Even tobacco smoking is not 
reducible to a chemical addiction; its eradication requires actions across cultural, legal, 
environmental, economic, educational and mass psychological planes, and more. Hence the 
need for partnerships is the argument. In reality, however, PPPs are neither neutral nor 
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benign.128-131 They muzzle potential intervention and modes of confronting the forces which 
shape ill-health. 
 
Nor are PPPs new. The success of the late 19th century hygiene movement depended on 
supplies and the marketing of the soap, disinfectants, and detergents industries, for 
example.113 Their growth made vast fortunes for families some of whose commercial 
empires remain today (Johnson & Johnson, Unilever, Procter & Gamble). These past PPPs 
also contained conflicts of interest, but today the tensions are of a different order. PPPs are 
presented as the dominant institutional response for almost everything not just in public 
health but healthcare itself, education, societal infrastructure such as transport, water, food 
supplies and knowledge. The genome and genetic information became issues shrouded by 
patents and intellectual property exploration.132 Had it not been for the Wellcome Trust’s 
intervention and leadership, the human genome could easily have been patented for private 
profit.133 Bits of genome have been, and huge investment is currently expended in 
personalised medicine, financed by hedge funds and others.  
 
To the question of what drives change therefore, comes several answers: not just idealism, 
not just well-intentioned philanthropy and not just the serendipitous alignment between 
health goals and the search for profit. These existing avenues leave open a vast terrain of 
possibility. If the first public health movements were indeed social movements, usually led 
by professional groups, members of social élites, technical and scientific specialists, and in 
some cases radicals and free thinkers, such a collective effort constituted an entirely 
unpredictable blend of talents, beliefs and attitudes. Since we cannot predict in advance the 
mixture of social forces into the future, we therefore cannot rule any out either. It is a 
situation calling for openness and plurality. In the new conditions of the 21st century, new 
social movements must be embraced, and not side-lined or patronised as unqualified, non-
scientific or unprofessional. The public health movement should acknowledge few 
boundaries. 
Is the public health movement addressing the right vectors? 
 
The question of the place of public health goes much further than a purely ideological or 
intellectual debate. The models vary in how they conceive of progress and how they fit this 
new economic, social and cultural landscape. In our view, public health practice and its 
associated movements have been corralled into too narrow a policy terrain, forced to 
employ models and institutions inherited from the 20th century, or earlier, which are not 
fully appropriate today. Indeed, what powers and foci are actually needed today?  
 
In 1963, Aldous Huxley, the writer, brother to the biologist Julian Huxley, who established 
the United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), voiced the 
hope that the World Health Organisation, alongside the other bodies of the United Nations 
in the wake of post World War 2 reconstruction, would form the “beginnings of a new 
ecological politics.” 
134
 The WHO had drawn directly from the earlier and now forgotten 
League of Nations’ Health Organisation.135 That, in turn, drew on experience in tackling 
contagions and the health consequences of trade and the movement of people spreading 
diseases in the age of Empire.136, 137 Those functions are needed – as witnessed by the 2014-
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15 Ebola outbreak in Africa138 – and many public health advances have been spawned out of 
a mixture of self-interest, trade and efficiency arguments.   
 
So why are not modern institutions not addressing the equivalent vectors of ill-health, when 
the case for doing so is so powerful?139 In some part, in the case of the attempts to weaken 
UNESCO, for example, the answer is to be found in power politics. 140 International agencies 
are easy to attack, often defined as wayward (ie, independently minded) by the dominant 
powers, and in any case difficult to fund. A 2015 independent review, commissioned to 
inquire into the WHO’s handling of Ebola, argued that WHO must re-establish its pre-
eminence as “the guardian of global public health” and that UN should ensure that the 
organisation put global health issues “at the centre of the global security agenda.” In order 
to do so, the organisation required both a cultural shift from within as well as far greater 
political and financial support from without, noting that no core funds were available for a 
emergency response such as presented by Ebola.141 In other words, in terms of health 
security or population health, interventions at the international level rank very poorly, if at 
all, and especially in comparison with military spending.  
 
Another argument is the sheer complexity of multilevel, multifactorial, multi-agency 
governance, and that expectations of perfect, quick solutions which are nigh impossible to 
meet. Another reason given by social scientists is perceptions of urgency or focus have 
radically changed. Late 20th century economies have provided real comforts in living: warm 
houses, clean food, mains water, safe, reliable transport.  These have softened life’s harder 
edges and have shifted perceptions of the locus of threat. Risks have declined while the 
perception, awareness and distortions of risk have risen.142 Cutting across these is the 
realisation that consumerism is undermining itself and ourselves, not just through  drivers of 
change such as climate change or resource access linked inequalities but also through a 
‘lock-in’ between culturally-set modes of living and health consequences. Problems are 
normalised but bemoaned. Cynicism sets in - ‘what can we do?’ or ‘the public won’t like it’ – 
a diminution of past ambition which must now be exposed, confronted and re-channelled.  
 
What might be identified as a list of vector candidates that the public health movement 
ought to be confronting today is lengthening. Alongside traditional enemies, like dirt and 
disease, might be otherwise defined as desirable or aspirational modes of living. They 
includes automobiles (reducing activity and symbolising carbon emissions), the internet and 
social media (shaping ideas and lifestyles), the media and cultural industries (developing 
consumer expectations), tourism (for the fantasy of escape), the food industries (for calorie 
over-production and moulding tastes) and e-commerce (to bring the whole world to our 
homes), for example.143-147 Even to identify such normal and accepted features of the 
modern economy as ‘vectors’ risks the accusation of being anti-progress - or more 
accurately, anti-prosperity or anti-technology.  Yet to do so is not a call to return to ‘simpler 
times’ but only to acknowledge that modern public health actors are being left in the slow 
lane as other, usually commercial forces, determine the conditions under which people live 
and shape the cultural parameters of everyday life.  Some of these forces, of course, 
constitute contributors to PPPs, provide commercial and branded face to public events, such 
the Olympics or football tournaments. The default position underlying all is ‘choice culture’ 
whereby corporate brands become both ally and counterpart to neoliberal economics.  
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Such a sober assessment of unequal power and the shaping of context is not new, rather it 
provides a more realistic insight into the herculean tasks undertaken by the public health 
movements of the past; members of this movement dared to think the unthinkable and 
imagine better modes of living, and to confront the emergent forms of modernity of their 
day. 148 One lesson is that the heroes and heroines were not working in isolation but with 
others, organised in campaigns. Nor, as we noted, were they endlessly successful but faced 
continual setbacks. They were opportunistic, just like those of recent years, to cite two 
examples, who took the chance to ban smoking on public transport in the wake of a London 
Underground fire,149 or to create food safety agencies at national and European levels out of 
the ashes of BSE (‘mad cow disease’).150, 151 Similarly, on a far larger scale, the experience of 
World War 2 gave a major opportunity to create institutions to champion public health and 
intervene in its shaping conditions. A generation of health professionals won public support 
to change structures and to prevent rather than patch up problems.152 The point is that 
nothing then was inevitable and what we view today as practical, uncontroversial measures 
had to be fought for. History may look like a narrative of unfolding progress, but at each 
point outcomes might have been otherwise, and in some cases actually were. And of course, 
the same is true of the future. The future cannot easily be predicted, but it can be made. 
 
It is surely time for the modern public health movement similarly to take stock of what we 
are against or what we are for, and on that basis to review existing goals, institutions and 
powers. Table 4 takes a long historical perspective, suggesting that there have been five key 
phases in the creation of modern international public health institutions and proposes a 
sixth is unfolding.  The table illuminates the question of what institutions are required to 
address the vectors of ill-health and to pursue ecological public health today. Some 
dilemmas are well established, but unavoidable, such as the seemingly inexorable demands 
of healthcare, which, by virtue of its mounting costliness, undermines investment in 
prevention. Others, as was noted in Table 2, are more uncertain. Health improvement in an 
era requiring ecological public health cannot rely on finance and trade to provide capital and 
wealth generation, lest these be the preserve only of the rich countries. The starting 
premise must be that all societies need ecological public health at their core. Today, as this 
paper has argued, the public health project faces major choices.  In Table 4, for schematic 
purposes we highlight two significant path options, among the many possible, in the sixth 
and emerging phase of public health..  
 
 
 
Table 4. Phases in the creation of modern Public Health Institutions 
 
Phase  Period (in 
rich 
economies) 
Actions  Institutions created Comment 
Phase 1 Mid 19
th
 
century 
Experimentation with 
engineering 
Sanitary inspectors; town 
planners 
Local or national in focus 
and impact 
Phase 2 Late 19
th
 
century 
First global 
agreements  
Infection controls First acknowledgement of 
global implications 
Phase 3 early C20
th
 Membership of 
international 
institutions via 
League of Nations  
International Health 
Organisation; International 
Labour Organisation. 
Formalisation of 
governance procedures 
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Phase 4 post WW2 Separation of United 
Nations from finance 
& economic 
organisations 
UN alongside Bretton 
Woods (World Bank, IMF), 
plus ancillary bodies, like 
OECD 
Separation between 
public health and 
‘economy’ enshrines 
economics in prime role 
Phase 5 Late 20
th
 
century 
Creation of ad-hoc 
public bodies and 
conventions  
UN : UNEP, UNCTAD,etc., 
Finance: G8, G20, World 
Trade Organisation, etc. 
These add to policy scope 
and reach but also to 
fragmentation  
Phase 6 Early to 
mid 21
st
 
century? 
PATH A:  
Incremental 
modification of 
business-as-usual 
Continued dominance of 
finance institutions over 
health. Emphasis on 
bilateral trade deals to 
maintain economic growth 
Aims to keep using 
natural resources for 
growth and to fund public 
health as ‘optional extra’ 
  PATH B: 
Reconfiguration for 
Ecological Public 
Health 
Merger of UNEP, WHO, ILO, 
UN-Habitat? 
Goal to create a new 
powerful ecological 
public health body 
 
Source: authors 
 
Path A is the pursuit of business-as-usual but modified by incremental change, negotiation 
and vulnerability to disruptive events. In Path A externalised costs mount, and PPPs are 
offered as mechanisms of ameliorative action. Path B, the pursuit of political economy in 
line with ecological public health, is characterised by different economic drivers and new 
patterns of work and wealth conservation, such as fossil fuel energy reduction and 
conservation, sustainable land use, full cost accounting (to internalise environmental, 
dietary and health costs), and lower impact lifestyles incorporating ‘new’ features such as 
physical activity in daily life. We have argued elsewhere that if society was serious about 
tackling obesity, as one example only, then the entire social system would need significant 
re-direction.153 Table 2 earlier set out some of the enormous issues to be confronted.  
 
Critics might dismiss Path B as idealistic and appropriate, if at all, only for Western over-
consuming, high-impact economies, and as not appropriate for under-consuming, poorer 
economies. ‘Don’t raise the drawbridge on advances, which you have and others want’ is 
one criticism. This has been answered by the UK’s Royal Society in its report on policy 
options for global development.154 This proposed a ‘Contract and Converge’ (C&C) 
approach, under which rich societies would reduce their high impact existences, emission 
rates and waste while poorer economies are permitted initially to raise theirs to higher 
standards of living, but then the obligation under C&C is for all to reduce them. C&C has the 
advantage of aiming for an equitable world but where sustainability is ‘built in’. In reality, 
such transitions – a mode of analysis we champion elsewhere 19 -  are rarely so orderly or 
consensual. More likely is a mix of pragmatism, crisis response, drift and expediency. Our 
point is that when faced by troubling indicators across such a wide range of issues, as is 
found today, the public health movement ought to begin the serious modelling of changes 
which are proportionate to the fundamental problems this article seeks to emphasise: the 
mismatch of bodies, environment, economy and political processes.  
 
At the UN, such big thinking certainly exists but is frustratingly hesitant and slow. In 1999, 
the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set targets for key indicators for public 
health.155, 156  In 2012, at the Rio+20 conference, new Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) were proposed and are finalised by the end of 2015.157 These are closer to ecological 
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public health thinking but are vague in relation to the dominant economic growth model. 
Perhaps that is inevitable, but it indicates that UN processes have not been, up to now, 
under serious pressure for a radical rethink. The Great Recession has been weathered, with 
only modifications rather than a reorientation of political economy.  The SDGs will be 
significant, however, and the public health movement should ensure that global targets are 
not lost at the national and local level, by holding governments, public and commercial 
actors to account. One should remember how the original 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (Rio) inspired action at the local level. All over the world, 
teams of local agencies, inspired by Rio’s Local Agenda 21, produced a new kind of 
ecological public health thinking, practice and campaigns for change.  
 
Experience teaches that there is always room for public health manoeuvre. Allies are 
essential. As noted one profession, planners, have been side-lined for too long often but 
have significant capacity to lead such processes. The pursuit of ecological public health 
requires new consortia, not just of local planners, but environmental health and public 
health practitioners, community development bodies, arts and cultural organisations and 
others to come together to start planning what a better infrastructure for health would look 
like, and to help build examples of positive examples to drive local economies. Movements 
for Healthy Cities, Sustainable Food Cities, Transition Towns and counterparts across the 
planet are scouting this territory already, building the case for a positive model of what 
more sustainable communities could be.158, 159 A stationary state, no-growth or circular 
economy, or even the promotion of what development economist Joseph Stiglitz calls 
“growth of the right kind”160 implies neither an inactive citizenry nor technological stasis. 
Investments become directed towards technologies, economic sectors or employment 
enhancing opportunities which promote mutualism between social goals and sustainable 
development. One of the many keys to change is the establishment of new incentives for 
economic institutions to become more resource-light and employment rich.  Ultimately 
economic success is reliant upon the status of natural ecosystems and human health upon 
which economic processes ultimately rely.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has suggested that what has been described as a Golden Era of public health 
might not have been so golden after all, as it depended upon mounting inequalities of 
wealth, between as well as within societies, unsustainable use of resources, and willingness 
to disregard the external costs or collateral effects which a version of economic growth 
produced and indeed was dependent upon. That said, the era saw substantial 
improvements across many fields and improvements in general levels of population and 
personal health. What the qualified success of the era portends for the future is less clear, 
however. Many indicators  - obesity, inequalities, ecosystem threats - are rising and the 
potential for some societies to ‘grow’ their way forward are compromised by many factors,  
in which resource limits, resource use feedback, and failures of democratic governance are 
merely the most prominent. 
 
In these messy circumstance the public health professions cannot and should not hide 
behind what has been conditioned intellectual reflex of calling for ‘more research, more 
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evidence’; that is always true but not a reason for delay.  On the contrary, we should be 
more collectively noisy in championing ecological public health as the core of the new 21st 
century political economy, and not just separate out the indicators of human health, outside 
of consideration of the conditions which shape health, and seeing it as a consequence of a 
trickle down from unsustainable growth. In arguing the cause of ecological public health no 
claim of novelty is made here. Many of the key arguments, and in remarkably similar terms, 
have been made before, more than a half a century ago.161 The call for UN agencies to be 
the developmental agencies for ecological public health measures, as noted, has been made 
before. What differs today? At that time such analyses or prescriptions may have been 
judged discretional or optional, with growth being seen the prime motor of public health 
success. Today, we argue, ecological public health is no longer discretional or optional is 
being forced upon society by growing evidence of eco-systems stress and by societal 
dislocation. We see the coming period as one where proponents must argue for ecological 
public health not only as the pathway which best avoids, or mitigates against, predictions of 
collapse, but as one which also addresses the rising levels of NCDs, which in other respects 
may be the most redolent of the health afflictions of our current age.  
 
This is an argument as much about values as about threats, evidence as well as narrative, 
choices as well as limits.  Indeed, it is not so markedly dissimilar from that deployed more 
than a century and a half ago by Edwin Chadwick in order to marshal his case for change 
(and whether later critics agreed with him or not.)162 The public health movement always 
needs better integration of datasets and thinking, and must argue not just for their 
maintenance but expansion. Interdisciplinary knowledge such as is required for ecological 
public health action is essential. New kinds of meta-analyses are needed - serious, 
systematic summations of evidence about threats to 21st century health. While much of this 
data will be national, regional or global, we see immediate opportunity for such cross-
sectoral, cross-institutional data pooling and action at the local level. It is here that tackling 
some of the enormity of the global challenges becomes feasible and practicable. Ecological 
public health, like all other models, can only emerge if its champions tackle the scale, power 
and influence of anti-health forces over the modern world. One can only admire the 
courageous work of some researchers and small NGOs tackling the anti-health dynamics of 
marketing and ‘spin’, for instance.163 This task cannot be underestimated, nor the emerging 
imbalance between private data and public: advertisers, marketing companies, technology 
firms, even supermarket giants, know vast amounts about human behaviour. Public – 
private tensions over the nature of and access to Big Data, for example, is an issue emerging 
in this area.164 We see the need for reconfiguration of academic centres studying and 
supporting ecological public health with more cross-institution working. The 2014-15 Lancet 
UCL Commission on climate change and health points a way for such public and policy 
messages.84 Ecological public health is more than an argument based on financial costs or 
the capacity to manipulate behaviour; it is a matter of values, long-term perspective, and 
the pursuit of a practical vision of human progress. In this manner, the path from 
Sanitarianism to Ecological Public Health is not as tortuous or as frustrating as it first 
appears.  
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